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B.: Extension of Legislative In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Co

STUDENT NOTES
the juvenile court has no power at all to transfer the case back.
Therefore, as to such persons, the presumption of doli incapax is
conclusive. This interpretation does no injustice to either the constitution or the statutory provisions. It is consistent with the court's
interpretation in State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, and more nearly
approaches the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statutes
relating to child welfare.
Conclusion
Since the proceedings in the juvenile courts are not criminal in
nature and no conviction or punishment may result therefrom, it is
apparent that no criminal jurisdiction was conferred upon the juvenile courts. The delinquency jurisdiction of the juvenile courts is
"exclusive", however, in the sense that acts, which under the statute
constitute delinquency, and which formerly were punishable as
crimes, are now prima facie noncriminal and no longer within the
jurisdiction of the circuit and criminal courts, except where the
juvenile court has found that a person above the age of sixteen years
possesses that degree of malice which makes up for his lack of age.
The opinion of the attorney general that criminal charges against
juveniles may be instituted and prosecuted in the criminal courts
is contrary to the law of this state, as evidenced by the constitution,
the pertinent statutes, the principles of the common law and the
expressed intention of the legislature.
L. L. P.
EXTENSION OF LEciSLATVE IN PERSONAm JUBIsDICTION OvER
FOREIGN COB'oR-IToNs

In the past twelve years, a number of leading cases have established a substantially new test of legislative jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.' The liberalization began with InternationalShoe v.
Washington2 which recognized the impracticability of the fictional
consent3 and presence 4 doctrines as valid methods of determining
whether or not a state can constitutionally exercise in personam
1 Shutt v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (2d
Cir. 1956); Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 842 U.S. 487 (1952);
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 839 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 810 (1945).
2826 U.S. 810 (1945).
3 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
4 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 284 U.S. 579 (1914).
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jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 5 These doctrines were replaced by a more realistic, though hardly less vague, test of whether
or not a foreign corporation's activities and contacts within the state
have been such as would make it reasonable and just under "traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice" to subject it
to suit in the state courts. 6 In the absence of these somewhat nebulous minimum contacts, subjection to in personam jurisdiction is
a denial to the foreign corporation of the protection of due process
of law.7
By an amendment to W. VA. CODE c. 31, art. 1, § 71 (Michie
1955), the West Virginia legislature during its last regular session8
attempted to further extend the in personam jurisdiction of our
courts over the activities of foreign corporations in West Virginia.9
That portion of the amendment under discussion provides that a
foreign corporation not authorized to do business in West Virginia
will nevertheless be deemed to be doing business here if it "makes
a contract to be performed, in whole or in part, by any party thereto,
in this state, or if such corporation commits a tort, in whole or in
part in this state."10
The constitutionality of this section is at best questionable. It
would permit, for instance, nonresidents to sue a foreign corporation
in West Virginia in an in personam proceeding. Suppose A, an
Oregon corporation, contracts in Oregon with B, a Florida corporation, to deliver goods to Florida; B to pay part of the purchase price
to A's creditor, C, a West Virginia resident. Under the language
of the amendment," A could acquire personal jurisdiction over B
by serving the state auditor,' 2 and would therefore be entitled to
recover an in personam judgment against B in West Virginia. There
5 See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Partin v. Micbaels
Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1958). Note, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 528

(1949).

6826 U.S. 310 (1945).

See also Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F.

Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Dillon v. Allen-Parker Co., 233 Miss. 888,
78 So. 2d 857 (1955).
81957.

9 Senate Bill No. 179, p. 8, as furnished by the Honorable J. Howard
Myers, Clerk of the Senate of West Virginia.
10

Ibid.

112 Ibid.

1 W. VA. CoDE c. 81, art. 1, § 71 (Michie 1955).
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is little doubt but that such an attempted suit would be held unconstitutional as a violation of jurisdictional due process.' 8
The minimum contact requirement must be applied to each
factual situation to determine its applicability. 14 To test the constitutionality of the principal amendment, 15 therefore, it must be
applied to specific situations. Suppose P, a West Virginia corporation, contracts in New York to buy goods from D, a New York corporation, the goods sold f.o.b. New York to be used in West Virginia.
D has not previously done business in this state. P alleges the
goods are defective, and sues D in West Virginia to recover damages, serving substituted process on the auditor.16 Our statute is
undoubtedly broad enough to encompass this situation, and subject
D to in personam proceedings in our courts.
In ErlangerMills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,1 7 decided prior to the

enactment of the principal amendment, a federal district court held
that a less extensive North Carolina statute18 applied to the above
facts was unconstitutional, violating jurisdictional due process because of the state's failure to meet the minimum contact rule for
legislative jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the same result would be reached with even
less difficulty under the West Virginia statute. 19 There is simply
no sufficient contact in West Virginia by D in the above facts to
meet the requirements as set forth in InternationalShoe.2 0
To further illustrate the extensiveness of the principal amendment,21 another situation may be examined. Suppose P, a resident
of West Virginia (or of any other state according to a fair interpretation of the amendment), sues D, a Delaware corporation for
alleged libel in a magazine which D publishes and sells to indepen3 Note 7 supra. See Remington Rand v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F.
Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1956); Anderson v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 144
F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
34 Orange-Crush Grapico Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174

(N.D. Ala. 1955).

15 Note 9 supra.
16 W. VA. CODE
17

c. 81, art. 1, § 71 (Michie 1955).
289 F.2d 502 (N.C. 1956).

Is2B N.C. STATS. § 55-38.1 (Michie 1950).
19 Note 9 supra.
20 326 U.S. 810 (1945). Although the "doing business" test is not controlling, see C. T. CoRP. SYsTEm, WHAT CoNsrrrurEs Donc Busnsmss (1956);

Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 747 (1954).
21

Note 9 supra.
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dent retailers including dealers in West Virginia. D's only contacts
in this state are casual, irregular, and unsubstantial visits by three
of its promotional employees. Quaere, can our courts obtain in
personam jurisdiction over D on the basis of these facts by the use
of substituted service of process? Under the wording of our statute,22 apparently so since a tort was committed each time the libel23
ous material was read in this state.
The supreme court of North Carolina, in Putnam v. Triangle
Publications,2 4 held, however, that the same North Carolina statute 25 held unconstitutional in ErlangerMills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills2 6
was also unconstitutional as applied to the above tort claim. The
basis for the decision in Putnam v. TrianglePublications27 was that
the minimum contact test had not been met.
It should be noted that the West Virginia court apparently uses
a double standard to determine jurisdiction over foreign corporations depending on whether the action is based on a contract or a
tort.2 8 But again it is submitted that our statute2 9 could not be
upheld under the facts in the Putnam v. TrianglePublicationscase 0
no matter what view is followed.
Only one case has permitted an extension of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on a single tort where
there was no other business contact.3 1 That case is of some importance because the Vermont statute32 construed therein is almost
identical with the West Virginia amendment under discussion. 33
22
23

Ibid.
See Labonte v. American Mercury Magazine, 98 N.H. 163, 96 A.2d 200

(1953).

445 (N.C. 1957).
5 2B N.C. STATS. § 55-38.1 (Michie 1950).

24 96 S.E.2d

502 (N.C. 1956).
445 (N.C. 1957).
- De Board v. B. Perini & Sons, 87 S.E.2d 462 (1955); Comment, 58 W.
VA. L. REv. 199 (1955). The court held that West Virginia (1) has jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which, while doing business in this state, contracts with a resident, withdraws from the state, and subsequently breaches the
contract; (2) has no jurisdiction if the withdrawal is subsequent to an act but
before a tort occurs as a result thereof.
2
9 Note 9 supra.
30 96 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1957).
31 Smyth v. Twin City Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
26239 F.2d
27 96 S.E.2d
2

(1951).
3

2 VT.STATS.

33 Note

c. 72, § 1562 (1947).

9 supra.
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The Smyth v. Twin City Improvement Corp. case 34 has been criticized as violating the minimum contact test, however, and should
not be considered as a controlling decision. 35
The cases involving single torts must of course be distinguished
from decisions construing the constitutionality of nonresident motorists statutes. 30
In view of the Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes FibreMilSk37 and Putcases, it is fairly apparent that the principal amendment is
subject to valid criticism in that it ignores the minimum contact
test which is now the controlling factor in these cases.3 9 In many
instances, the principal amendment must undoubtedly be held to
be unconstitutional as a violation of jurisdictional due process.
nam8 8

Our legislators either were not aware of the decisions in the
two North Carolina cases40 reported in the advance sheets prior
to the enactment of the principal amendment, or else they ignored
them. In either event, failure to be familiar with and take into
account such recent constructions of statutes similar to those proposed is not conducive to the enactment of valid, workable laws.
C. H. B., Jr.

34

(1951).
35
(1952).

Smyth v. Twin City Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
Comment, 100 U. PA. L. 1Ev. 598 (1952); see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1202

36 For example, W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 8, § 81 (Michie 1955). The distinction is based on holdings that a motor vehicle is a dangerous instrumentality. Brown v. Hughes, 186 F. Supp. 55 (M.D. Pa. 1955); Hess v. Palowski,
274 U.S. 852 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
37289 F.2d 502 (N.C. 1956).
38 96 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1957).
39 826 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co.,
122 Cal. App. 2d 876, 265 P.2d 180 (1953).
40 Notes 17 and 24 supra.
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